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ABSTRACT
Although California’s redevelopment law is among the strictest in the 
nation, from a layperson’s perspective, redevelopment agencies (RDAs) appear to 
be no more obstructed from their projects in California as they would be in, say, 
Connecticut.  This article addresses a sort of “tragedy of the commons” problem 
applied to redevelopment: If redevelopment powers are “over-harvested” such as 
to instigate serious political revolt against them, they will become barren and 
useless, and will no longer be available for the purposes for which they were 
intended and for which they are still needed.  Even assuming that redevelopment 
is efficacious and necessary, redevelopment law ought not be made impotent.  In 
a post-Kelo society, redevelopment finds itself in danger of being neutered of its 
ability to do what it is truly meant to do: to overcome market failure in urban 
areas and restore and preserve the vitality of our communities.  If redevelopment 
agencies abuse their powers by manipulating the market rather than facilitating it, 
they expose themselves to political attack in an already volatile property rights 
climate.  We are in need of reform that reminds RDAs why they exist in the first 
place: as market-facilitators, not revenue-generators.
The problem cannot be properly addressed at the local level.  In the 
example of 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, it became 
clear that unscrupulous businesses will employ hostage-taker strategies to capture 
the RDA’s eminent domain power.  Cities are left resorting to economically-
cogent-yet-legally-pathetic claims such as “future blight” in order to appease “800 
pound gorillas” like Costco or Wal-Mart.  Thus it is not enough for local 
governments to self-regulate their use of eminent domain; the regulation must 
come from without.  Because an ill-conceived redevelopment regime allows rent-
seekers to blackmail cities, and because it entices cities to use coercive bargaining 
and offend landowners’ sensibilities, RDAs are in danger of ruining the tools it 
needs to achieve their true purpose of blight removal.  Thus without careful 
review, RDAs threaten to kill the golden goose.  
The solution lies in removing the blight from our redevelopment law, and 
in redeveloping the motivation that drives our redevelopment agencies. 
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Good redevelopment might be good policy, depending on whom you ask.  
Propertarians might concede nothing when it comes to the value in government-
initiated redevelopment.  But when it comes to bad redevelopment, well, it’s just 
plain bad—there’s no dressing it up.  Bad redevelopment takes our homes, 
churches, and businesses, robs our schools of funds, and sinks our cities and 
towns into unfathomable debt.1 Worst of all, it exists to serve businesses with 
deep pockets rather than the general welfare.2
But bad redevelopment is not only bad for citizens, it is bad for California 
redevelopment agencies.  A bad redevelopment structure dooms agencies into a 
self-perpetuating chasm of impropriety,3 debt,4 blackmail,5 and public scorn.6
Bad redevelopment policy turns otherwise good city council members into 
ineffective, incompetent, or crooked redevelopment board members—any 
positive effects resulting from such a system could only be pure coincidence.  
Worst of all, a bad redevelopment structure creates a hostile environment for 
redevelopment in general—even good redevelopment.
1 Redevelopment: The Unknown Government, Municipal Officials for Redevelopment 
Reform, 2006, at 11 [hereinafter MORR Report] (“Redevelopment agencies are debt machines 
that have amassed over $61 billion in statewide bonded indebtedness.”).  
2
 This article will explain not only why this is true, but that, since the public has come to 
perceive it as true, the actual verifiability of the claim is largely irrelevant.   
3 See infra Part V (discussing one response by the California legislature to redevelopment 
agencies’ tendency to abuse their powers).
4
 MORR Report, supra note 1 (“Debt is not just a temptation.  It is a requirement.”).
5 See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing how Costco forced the City of Lancaster’s hand into 
condemning a profitable 99 Cents Only store). 
6 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the public’s response to the current redevelopment 
schema).
Who Will Redevelop Redevelopment? 4
This article sets out the relevant California law that defines redevelopment 
agencies (RDAs) and grants the awesome power of eminent domain.7  California 
law purports to put strict limits on RDAs by requiring findings of physical and 
economic blight.  However, the statutes are often ambiguously or loosely drafted 
so as to provide RDAs some play in the joints.  The article will then discuss how 
courts have treated the removal of market obstacles like blight, from the removal 
of oligopolies8 to physical and economic blight,9 to finally the federal standard 
that economic revitalization alone is sufficient to justify the use eminent 
domain.10  Although some commentators urge that we have little to worry from 
the Supreme Court’s vacuous public use standard set forth in Kelo v. City of New 
London,11 California’s friendly tax increment financing structure encourages 
RDAs to redevelop as much as possible, and thus to use the ambiguities in 
California’s community redevelopment law (CRL) and the courts’ legislative 
7
 “Eminent domain—the government's authority to force a property owner to sell his or 
her land to the government for ‘just compensation’—has long been regarded as one of the most 
jarring and intrusive of government's powers.”  Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will 
Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform? 707 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jan. 2006), 
available at SL049 ALI-ABA 703 (Westlaw).  “[E]minent domain [is] a legal term meaning ‘we 
can do anything we want.’”  Steve Lopez, In the Name of Her Father, TIME, July 14, 1997, at 4.  
Eminent domain is the state’s “most awesome grant of power” to municipalities.  See City of 
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 419 (1985). 
8
 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1984).
9
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954). 
10
 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
11 See Bruce Tepper, The Weight of Kelo, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Mar 29, 2006, at 37-
38.
Since the Court specifically acknowledged that California has carefully limited 
the exercise of eminent domain to make sure that the type of taking that 
occurred in New London does not occur in California, one must question 
whether the recent push for redevelopment reform is grounded in sound policy 
and logic or is actually more opaque.
Id.
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deference to their advantage. This article will then discuss some landmark 
California cases that illustrate the lengths to which RDAs will go to circumvent 
the CRL blight requirements.  These cases also illustrate the danger to which a 
bad redevelopment structure exposes RDAs when it inspires unscrupulous rent-
seekers, lusting for the benefits of eminent domain, to hold cities’ tax revenues 
hostage by threatening to relocate.  For all these reasons, redevelopment abuse in 
California is rampant,12 despite the fact that California’s redevelopment law 
provides one of the strictest blight requirements in the nation.  If this regime is 
permitted to continue, it will lead to real difficulties for land use planning in 
California.  
II. CALIFORNIA REDEVELOPMENT LAW
A. Structure and Authority of the Redevelopment Agencies
California Health & Safety Code § 33100 provides that “[t]here is in each 
community a public body, corporate and politic, known as the redevelopment 
agency of the community.”13 Redevelopment agencies are thus created and 
operated without a vote of the citizens affected.  In California, 386 cities out of a 
total 478 operate their own RDA.14 The RDA’s powers are vested in its current 
members,15 which consist of five resident electors of the community, and may be 
12 See Sandefur, supra note 7, at 736.
13
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33100 (West 2006) (emphasis added).
14
 MORR Report, supra note 1, at 2.
15
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33121 (West 2006).
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increased to seven upon adoption of an ordinance by the city council.16  The 
members may not be elective officers or employees of the city.17  The 
redevelopment agency board members sit for four year terms,18 and aside from 
the appointment of the first RDA chairman,19 the board is mostly autonomous, 
and will subsequently elect its own chairman from among its members.20 Fiscal 
overhead includes board members’ “actual and necessary expenses,” including 
travel expenses, and other legislatively prescribed compensation.21  Although this 
compensation structure appears innocuous, fiscal year 2003-04 saw a $580 
million expenditure on redevelopment administration.22  This accounted for 11% 
of the $5.3 billion that California redevelopment age ncies spent that year.23
These RDAs are given the power to “redevelop,” which is 
the planning, development, replanning, redesign, clearance, 
reconstruction, or rehabilitation, or any combination of these, of all 
or part of a survey area, and the provision of those residential, 
commercial, industrial, public, or other structures or spaces as may 
16
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33110 (West 2006).
17 Id. § 33111.
18 Id.
19 Id. § 33113.
20 Id. § 33113.
21 Id. § 33114.
22
 MORR Report, supra note 1, at 20.  “This provides a lucrative bureaucratic base that 
redevelopment staffers seek to preserve and expand.”  Id.  If section 33115, providing for removal 
of RDA board members for inefficiency, is effective at all, it is apparently impotent in the face of 
the titanic RDA expenditures.  RDAs also contribute public monies to private groups that tout the 
advantages of redevelopment.  Two Groups Supported by LB Tax Dollars Work to Weaken or 
Defeat Homeowner Protection/Eminent Domain Reform Legislation…Without Council or 
Redevelopment Agency Board Public Discussion or Vote, LB REPORT.COM, Apr. 30, 2006,
http://www.lbreport.com/news/apr06/emdombi.htm (“The privately-run ‘League of CA Cities’ 
and the ‘CA Redevelopment Association’ operate in large part on public money sent to them as 
dues, memberships and event registrations by government officials on the public payroll...who in 
LB have (thus far) routinely expended the sums as ‘government-related.’”).
23 Id.
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be appropriate or necessary in the interest of the general welfare, 
including recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant 
to them and payments to school and community college districts . . 
. .
24
RDAs are subject to separate requirements regarding redevelopment of 
undeveloped areas:25 to qualify for redevelopment, undeveloped areas must be 
“stagnant or improperly utilized because of defective or inadequate street layout, 
faulty lot layout in relation to size, shape, accessibility, or usefulness, or for other 
causes,” or “[t]he areas require replanning and land assembly . . . in the interest of 
the general welfare because of widely scattered ownership, tax delinquency, or 
other reasons.”26  The language in these statutes is worded very favorably for 
RDAs: The requirement that government declare a neighborhood 
“blighted” before condemning property might protect property 
owners against government overreaching, if the definition of 
“blight” were precise enough to prevent the government from 
taking any but the most dangerous or extremely distressed 
property. Unfortunately, many states, such as California, have 
defined “blight” in terms so vague that officials are free to declare 
virtually any property “blighted.”27
24
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33020 (West 2006).
25
 It is worth noting that, as a matter of textual purity, RDAs would have no authority 
over undeveloped areas.  As a matter of fundamental purpose for the establishment of RDAs, there 
are few parallels for the need for governmental interference in developed versus undeveloped 
areas.  Removal of blight and other impediments to the free market are drastically less severe in 
undeveloped areas. 
26
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33021(c) (West 2006).
27
 Sandefur, supra note 7, at 717.  
The theory of economic development condemnations begins with the 
concept of “blight.”  Originally a term for a plant disease, the term “blight” was 
first applied to neighborhoods during the Progressive era, by urban planners who 
conceived of cities as similar to living organisms: when a neighborhood failed to 
perform up to the standard required by the “needs of the public,” it was up to the 
government to intercede and alter the economic situation so as to improve the 
neighborhood.
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“Inadequate” street layout may be a point of legitimate debate: a challenger may 
provide data, statistics, information about the general area, and other professional 
opinions to rebut the RDA’s claim of inadequacy.  “Defective” is much less 
tangible, however, and an RDA may assert its own standard of what “defective” 
is, making the claim unassailable.  “Widely scattered ownership” is ominous 
language for any homeowner who apparently could not possibly have any counter 
argument unless he set to the task for buying up his neighbors’ homes as well.28
But even then, the RDA apparently is invited to offer any “other causes”29 to 
validate their actions.
The RDA is granted the power of eminent domain to redevelop an 
established project area.30  The Code describes the proper use of eminent domain:
[W]henever the redevelopment of blighted areas cannot be 
accomplished by private enterprise alone, without public 
participation and assistance in the acquisition of land . . . it is in the 
public interest to employ the power of eminent domain . . . to 
provide a means by which blighted areas may be redeveloped or 
rehabilitated.31
Today, this attitude remains the keystone of economic development 
projects.
Id. at 716.
28 See Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 80 Cal. App. 4th 388, 407 (2000) 
(“The mere fact of multiple ownership does not establish blight. Otherwise, a condominium 
development by definition would be blighted.”).
29
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33021(c)(2) (West 2006).
30 Id. § 33391 (“Within the survey area or for purposes of redevelopment an agency may . 
. . [a]cquire real property by eminent domain.”).  The power of eminent domain is granted by the 
California Constitution.  Cal. Const. art. I, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or damaged for 
public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid 
to, or into court for, the owner.”).  The U.S. Constitution authorizes eminent domain at U.S. Const. 
amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
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Thus an RDA may only use eminent domain when the requisite findings of blight 
make such use necessary.  However, the Code provides that it is the RDA, not the 
judiciary, that is to determine when it is “necessary” to use eminent domain.32
B. Elimination of Market Impediments
The blight problem as stated in section 33036 is relatively uncontroversial:  
“[C]onditions of blight tend to further obsolescence, deterioration, and disuse 
because of the lack of incentive to the individual landowner and his inability to 
improve, modernize, or rehabilitate his property while the condition of the 
neighboring properties remains unchanged.”33  Alternatively stated, blight is a 
difficult challenge to the free market.  The Code goes further, stating that blight 
“constitutes a serious and growing menace which is . . . injurious and inimical to 
the public health, safety, and welfare.”34  Blight “present[s] difficulties and 
handicaps which are beyond remedy and control solely by regulatory 
processes.”35  Blight contributes to crime, juvenile delinquency, and increased 
31
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33037 (West 2006) (emphasis added).
32 Id. (“[T]he necessity in the public interest for the provisions of this part is declared to 
be a matter of legislative determination.”) (emphasis added); see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 
1240.010 (West 2006).
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property 
only for a public use. Where the Legislature provides by statute that a use, 
pur pose, object, or function is one for which the power of eminent domain may 
be exercised, such action is deemed to be a declaration by the Legislature that 
such use, purpose, object, or function is a public use.
Id. 
33
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33036(a) (West 2006).
34 Id. § 33035(a).
35 Id. § 33035(b).
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expenditures for police, fire, and other public services.36 The “benefits which will 
result from the remedying of . . . blighted areas will accrue to all inhabitants and 
property owners of the communities in which they exist.”37
The Code then begins to get more controversial, stating that, because of 
blight, “the process of deterioration . . . frequently cannot be halted or corrected 
except by redeveloping the entire area, or substantial portions of it.”38
“[R]emedying [blighted areas] may require the public acquisition . . . and the 
redevelopment of [those] areas.”39 This declaration is rephrased at section 
33030(a): “It is found and declared that there exist in many communities blighted 
areas which constitute physical and economic liabilities, requiring redevelopment
in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of these 
communities and of the state.”40 As a technical matter, of course, this statement is 
at the very best unverifiable; while the market may have certain observable 
tendencies towards blighted areas, it could not be said in any given case that the 
market could not correct the problem without RDA assistance.  The market may 
take longer to address the blight than the RDA is willing to wait, but it is quite 
possible and even likely that the market would eventually be sufficiently 
incentivized to develop the area on its own.  The issue is simply a matter of 
36 Id. § 33035(c).
37 Id. § 33035(e).
38 Id. § 33036(b).
39 Id. § 33036(d).
40 Id. § 33030(a) (emphasis added).
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patience and of faith that our free market system is, in fact, the best among the 
alternatives. 
The Code adds that “conditions of blight are chiefly found in areas 
subdivided into small parcels, held in divided and widely scattered ownerships.”41
It becomes clear that the drafters of the CRL misunderstood symptoms for causes, 
and thus misguidedly developed the CRL to eliminate the symptoms of blight, but 
made no provisions for the actual causes.  If  causes are to be eliminated in such a 
way, it would be purely coincidental.  The CRL formally lists the causes of blight 
in section 33039: “[T]he principal causes of slum and blighted residential areas 
are . . . [i]nadequate enforcement of health, building, and safety laws. . . . limited 
financial resources [of inhabitants] . . . . [r]acial discrimination . . . . [and the] 
neglect of absentee landlords.”42  Except for removing neglectful landlords, it is 
unclear how redevelopment purports to address any of these causes. 
Finally, to obtain approval for an RDA project, the agency must provide a 
report to the city council that, among other things, describes the project, describes 
the blight, explains how the project will further the RDA’s goals, explains why 
the free market alone could not overcome the blight, describes the method of 
financing, and describes how families will be relocated.43 Although this seems to 
41 Id. § 33036(c) (emphasis added).
42 Id. § 33039.
43 Id. § 33352.
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provide a substantial burden to the RDA, in practice these reports are typified by 
conclusory statements and boilerplate language.  
1. The Blight Standard
“Fully 25% of all urbanized land in California has now been declared 
blighted,”44 and under California law, blight designations can remain on the books 
indefinitely.45
Section 33030 explains what an RDA must provide to satisfy a finding of 
blight under the California standard.  The blight must create such a “serious 
physical and economic burden” that it could not “reasonably be expected to be 
reversed or alleviated by private enterprise or governmental action, or both, 
without redevelopment.”46 Thus the effect of the blight must be so serious that 
there could be no reasonable expectation of any other solution, be it private, 
government, or some hybrid.  In addition, the RDA must make a specific showing 
of both the physical and economic elements of blight under section 33031(a) and 
(b), respectively.47  Under section 33031(a), the RDA may prove the existence of 
physical blight by showing serious building code violations, unsafe or unhealthy 
buildings, factors hindering economically viable use, adjacent incompatible uses, 
inadequate utilities, inadequate and irregular lot sizes in multiple ownership, 
44
 MORR Report, supra note 1, at 4. 
45
 Sandefur, supra note 7, at 717.
46
 Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33030(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
47 Id. § 33030(b)(2).
Who Will Redevelop Redevelopment? 13
insufficient parking, or “other similar factors.”48 Under section 33031(b), the 
RDA may prove the existence of economic blight by showing static property 
values, high crime, relatively low lease rates or high business vacancies, or too 
many vacant lots, bars, liquor stores, or people.49 That California’s blight statutes 
are relatively strict is not comforting.  It is still open to abuse, and rent-seekers 
know it.  Section 33031(a)(2) and (3) “have been the subject of more frequent 
redevelopment misuses than any other part of the CRL. Focusing on greater 
precision in statutory definition than currently exists in these subsections of the 
blight statutes would have a far more meaningful effect on the perceived misuses 
of redevelopment.” 50
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE USE OF GOVERNMENT COERCION IN 
OVERCOMING MARKET IMPEDIMENTS
“In 1945, California was the first state to adopt a Community 
Redevelopment Act that gave cities and counties the ability to establish 
redevelopment agencies.”51 The vast power of government in its police powers 
governing land use has arguably been put to good use in overcoming classic 
market problems such as holdouts, free-riders, collective action, and oligopolies.  
In Midkiff, the U.S. Supreme Court held that breaking up a land oligopoly was a 
48 Id. § 33031(a).
49 Id. § 33031(b).
50
 Tepper, supra note 11, at 40 (footnotes omitted).
51 JEFF CHAPMAN, Tax Increment Financing and Fiscal Stress: The California Genesis, in 
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 114. 
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permissible exercise of the state’s eminent domain authority.52  Because the land 
was not likely to be made available for purchase by the general public by any 
reasonable efforts of the free market system, eminent domain is properly 
exercised to maintain a free property system.  Midkiff is an example of the use of 
eminent domain for the (at least ostensible) purpose of facilitating the free market 
system.  Because the Hawaii state authority did not have any further plans to put 
the property into the hands of other private individuals in particular (it was to be 
made available for purchase to the current tenants of the land), the exercise was 
reactive rather than proactive.  That is, the remedy restored the fate of the land to 
the free market. 53
Berman illustrates the next major step by state authorities to use the power 
of eminent domain in a more proactive way.  In Berman, Washington D.C. slums 
were labeled as physically and economically blighted, taken via eminent domain, 
and cleared and redeveloped by a private developer.  The Berman court held that 
blight-removal is a legitimate public use for which the power of eminent domain 
may be exercised.54 Berman can be seen as a logical step after Midkiff: if blight 
may be construed as an insurmountable market obstacle, akin to monopolies and 
oligopolies, the coercive power of eminent domain may be justified.  The holding 
52
 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1984).
53
 “[I]ronically,” however, “the effect of the law was perverse.  Instead of lowering, or at 
least maintaining home prices, it accomplished the opposite. It fueled a wholesale transfer of 
desirable homes to Japanese investors and provided huge economic incentives for the former land 
lessees to sell their homes and become instant millionaires.”  Gideon Kanner, The Public Use 
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335, 356 (2006).  
54
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
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guaranteed that blight-removal was a permissible purpose, something that city 
planners had banked on since the first federal urban redevelopment laws in the 
1960s.55 Berman, of course, deferred to the legislative determination over the 
severity of blight and whether it is truly a market obstacle, as does California’s 
redevelopment law.  What is more, Berman permitted the state agency to take 
parcels that did not meet the blight standard, but that were deemed “necessary” to 
fulfill the overall blight-removal project.56  This detail has been a source of alarm 
for many redevelopment critics.  This rule leaves open the question of how far the 
RDA should be permitted to go in determining which parcels are “necessary.”  If 
a state’s blight standard is already malleable, and if a court is to permit broad 
discretion in the municipality’s exercise of eminent domain to achieve 
redevelopment objectives in blight-removal, is allowing an RDA an additional 
indeterminate buffer sound policy?  Is it really even necessary?  Providing 
limitations to RDAs that are malleable and adjudicative at every step of the 
55 See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right for California Redevelopment Law, 
42 HASTINGS L. J. 991, 992 (2001).
Proponents of the first federal urban redevelopment law were 
concerned that federal courts might declare redevelopment unconstitutional . . . .
Blight removal brought redevelopment well within the ambit of “health and 
safety” since policy makers at that time were convinced that overcrowding in 
low income areas contributed to the spread of disease and crime.
Id.
56 Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
If owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on 
the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public 
interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly. . . . 
[C]ommunity redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be 
on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by building.
Id. 
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redevelopment process makes it difficult for courts to impose meaningful checks 
on their authority without being criticized as being judicial activists.  
Redevelopment law thus provides precious few opportunities for judicial checks. 
Berman’s treatment of legislative determinations of the nature and severity 
of blight may have been suspect, but the Michigan Supreme Court’s treatment in
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit57 was blatantly pretextual.  The 
circumstances surrounding Poletown were heart-wrenching: 4,200 people lost 
their homes, businesses, and churches for corporate welfare in its purest form.  In 
Berman, the U.S. Supreme Court had looked to aspects of both economic58 and 
physical59 blight, and determined that, where both of these elements exist, there is 
a plausible argument that the project area is beyond reasonable market correction.  
Poletown removed the physical blight requirement from the Michigan standard, 
allowing the full measure of eminent domain power to achieve purely economic 
purposes.60 The U.S. Supreme Court implicitly validated the Poletown decision 
in Kelo, a case with analogous facts.  The city of Detroit sought to supplant an 
entire residential neighborhood to make way for General Motors’ new Cadillac 
plant; the City of New London, Connecticut, sought to accommodate 
pharmaceutical giant Pfizer in a quaint downtown waterfront residential 
57
 410 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
58 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.1 (“‘Substandard housing conditions’ means . . . the 
existence of . . . lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or . . . dilapidation, overcrowding, 
faulty interior arrangement . . . .”).
59 Id.
60 Poletown, 410 N.W.2d at 459.
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neighborhood.  The Court held that potential future revenues deriving from 
Pfizer’s profitable use of the land was a public purpose, satisfying the Fifth 
Amendment.61  “The rationale of such cases is that some of the private economic 
benefits expected to be reaped by the redeveloper will trickle down . . . and will 
thus constitute a ‘public benefit’ which the Court equated with . . . ‘public use.’”62
Or in other words, “yuppification is a valid public purpose.”63
Thus in our case law respecting government powers in removing market 
obstacles, “we moved from ‘slum clearance’ to ‘urban renewal’ to ‘removing 
blight’ to ‘economic redevelopment.’”64
A. Redevelopment Under the Hathcock65 Standard
Some years after the Poletown decision, the Michigan Supreme Court 
thought better of its takings jurisprudence, and instituted a new standard in its 
decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.66 The Hathcock decision borrowed 
extensively from Justice Ryan’s dissenting opinion in Poletown,67 and set forth a 
new three-part disjunctive test to determine when an exercise of the eminent 
domain authority would be permitted .  
61
 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2665-66 (2005) (“Clearly, there is no 
basis for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public 
purpose.”).
62
 Kanner, supra note 53, at 336.
63 Id. 
64
 Theodore C. Taub, The Changing Landscape of Condemnation and Redevelopment
698 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Aug. 2005), available at SL005 ALI-ABA 693 (Westlaw). 
65
 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
66 Id. 
67
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
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1. “Public Necessity of the Extreme Sort”68
The taking is for a public use if it is towards achieving a public necessity 
of the extreme sort.  This test requires that the project not only be advantageous to 
the community, but that there be some dire or exigent need for it.  The 
condemning authority must demonstrate that the forced transfer “to a private 
entity involved ‘public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable.’”69
The necessity required by the Michigan Supreme Court is an actual, physical 
necessity; the “very existence [of the public benefits] depends on the use of 
land.”70  The kind of necessity intimated here includes the traditional examples of 
market failure: holdouts,71 free-riders, collective action, monopolies, and 
oligopolies.  This was the sort of necessity that arose in Midkiff, as well as in other 
cases in legal history such as the building of “highways, railroads, [and] canals.”72
It is this kind of necessity that would serve well in California, as it would force 
RDAs to act as a facilitator or mediator between private enterprise and market 
obstacles such as blight and holdouts, rather than as a market actor itself, with its 
own tax and revenue agendas.  Moreover, it would take the power of eminent 
domain from the pockets of prospective rent-seekers, since they would not be able 
68 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 
304 N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See Tepper, supra note 11, at 38 (“Eminent domain is particularly useful in 
redevelopment settings to acquire property from these ‘holdout’ property owners—that is, the 
owners who sell last in order to extract the highest prices.”).
72
 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005) (quoting Poletown, 410 
N.W.2d 455, 476 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
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to blackmail sales-tax-revenue-desperate cities unless they could show honest-to-
goodness blight.  While an RDA is certainly an administrative overhead whose 
costs are critically important to a bottom-line perspective, the objective of 
improving local revenues must be indirect, not direct.  When a government makes 
generating revenues its primary goal, it tends to abuse the terrific powers at its 
disposal to reach those goals by a shorter cut than our free-market system is
capable of.  
2. “Independent Public Significance”73
Eminent domain could be exercised under the Hathcock standard if the 
property itself has been “selected on the basis of ‘facts of independent public 
significance.’”74  In other words, it does not avail the RDA under this test to argue 
that, by bringing GM or Pfizer or any other private developer in to redevelop the 
land, new sales taxes will revitalize the city to a bustling utopia.  Instead, the 
agency must show that, whatever their ultimate plans for the land, the land is 
currently languishing in such a state of blight that its mere removal is required in 
73 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., 
dissenting)).
74 Id.; see also Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 114, 
123 (Cal. 1954), cert. denied.
Originally the definition of “public use” was very narrowly restricted. . . . [T]he 
more modern courts have enlarged the traditional definition of public use to 
include “public purpose.” The idea now is that the taking of the property itself, 
as distinguished from the subsequent use of that property, may be required in the 
public interest.
. . . . 
. . . [Since] the acquiring of the property is for a public use, its sale and the 
transfer of the property from one individual to another, so far as they may occur, 
are merely incidental to that use . . . .
Id.
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the interests of the public welfare.  This test implicitly assuages Justice 
O’Connor’s fears put forth in her Kelo dissent: since any property may be put to a 
higher and better use by some deep-pocketed developer, the “specter of 
condemnation hangs over all property.”75  But under this prong of the Hathcock 
test, the RDA would not be able to mount its public use claim from the empty 
guarantee of incidental sales tax revenues springing from the new Wal-Mart, auto 
dealership, business park, or GM plant.  Instead, government agencies are 
relegated to removing externalities that would inhibit such private uses.  With the
development landscape groomed this way, that is, without any additional 
pandering and influence from the redevelopment agencies, private enterprise 
would take its natural course in siting beneficial uses within the community.  This 
view has much deeper roots in Michigan case law, going back to an 1852 decision 
in Swan v. Williams.76  The Michigan Supreme Court in Swan noted the proper 
place for government in our system of free enterprise:
To say, as has been too often carelessly said, that “the acts done by
these corporations are done with a view to their own interests, from 
which an incidental benefit springs to the public,” is to admit their 
private character, and the private use of the property condemned to 
75
 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005); see also Lawrence Berger, The 
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 237 (1978) (arguing that 
monopoly and efficiency are not sufficient to justify a taking without an impending public need); 
see also Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 28 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 678 (2005) [hereinafter Sandefur: A Gleeful Obituary] 
(“Americans in most states are at risk of losing their homes to whatever faction is able to gain 
political influence.”); Gary P. Johnson, The Effect of the Public Use Requirement on Excess 
Condemnation, 48 TENN. L. REV. 370, 373-74 (1981) (“Consequently, courts began to look at the 
ultimate purpose of a project in order to justify a taking that eventually would benefit the public.”). 
76
 2 Mich. 427 (1852).
Who Will Redevelop Redevelopment? 21
their use. But it is obvious, that the object which determines the 
character of a corporation is that designed by the legislature, rather 
than that sought by the company. If that object be primarily the 
private interest of its members, although an incidental benefit may 
accrue to the government therefrom, then the corporation is 
private, but if that object be the public interest, to be secured by the 
exercise of powers, delegated for that purpose, which would 
otherwise repose in the State, then, although private interest may 
be incidentally promoted, the corporation is in its nature public—it 
is essentially the trustee of the government for the promotion of the 
objects desired—a mere agent, to which authority is delegated to 
work out the public interest through the means provided by 
government for that purpose, and broadly distinguishable from one 
created for the attainment of no public end, and from which no 
benefit accrues to the community except such as results 
incidentally, and not necessarily, from its operations.77
This is an astute observation, and one that has been largely ignored in more 
modern case law.  The issue, simply stated, is that where private actors create a 
public benefit, this benefit is incidental, and cannot therefore be the purpose of 
state action.  Instead, if a local government wishes to cite this benefit as a “public 
use” in order to exercise eminent domain authority, the private actor must become 
an agent of the public.  To strike a sort of middle ground, as is the modern state of 
affairs, is to establish a kind of unholy union between government and free 
enterprise, a system in which certain individuals are able to gain access to the 
sovereign governmental powers without the attendant governmental legal and 
political restrictions.  This is the source of frustration of propertarians, but more 
importantly, it encapsulates in heady legal prose what is so visceral and obvious
about the debate.  To take someone’s land to give to another is just plain irksome.  
77 Swan, 2 Mich. at 435.
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And at some point, it’s going to drive people crazy,78 or break their spirits.79 The 
Swan treatment warrants review in the wake of our current upheaval of eminent 
domain law post-Kelo. 
3. “Accountab[ility] to the Public”80
The third test under the Hathcock standard prohibits exercise of eminent 
domain authority “unless, after it is taken, it will be devoted to the use of the 
public, independent of the will of the corporation taking it.’”81 This test suggests 
a return to the Swan rationale, leaving behind fanciful constructions of private 
development as being effected for public use.  To meet the standard for 
employing the drastic measure of eminent domain, the project must truly be in the 
hands of the public.  Under this standard, regulation82 and subsidies83 would 
remain a public use, but clearing entire neighborhoods and assembling city blocks 
to make way for a new Costco would not.  Governments would be able to 
78 See infra, note 107, at 31 ( describing a condemnee who shot and killed two sheriff’s 
deputies in South Carolina).
79 See infra, Part IV.
80 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782.
81 Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455, 476 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting Berrien 
Springs Water Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 94 N.W. 379, 380-81 (Mich. 1903))).
82 See Sandefur: A Gleeful Obituary, supra note 75, at 656 (“One chief rationalization 
[for finding a public use] was that the railroad was regulated by the government in such a way as 
to render it essentially ‘public.’”).
83 See Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 653, 727 
(2005) [hereinafter Kanner:,Making Laws and Sausages] (remarking that subsidies were given to 
railroads because of the substantial reciprocal benefits given to society, and because of the great 
risk taken by the railroads, intimating that the government wished to make up the cost of risk by 
granting subsidies.)  However, subsidies are often also granted towards wasteful projects to reward 
political supporters.  Id. at 762-63.  See also Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. Los 
Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Cal. 1979) (“[A]irports so subsidized must be available for public 
use on ‘fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination, . . .’”).
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subsidize utilities that would pay enormous dividends to constituents, but may be 
too risky for private investors, or would not pay out sufficient dividends.84
Requiring the government to retain control over the project ensures accountability 
and the continued public usefulness of the project, rather than a mere hand-off to 
private investment.85
B. Tax Increment Financing Improperly Incentivizes RDAs
The financing structure behind California RDAs is out of alignment with 
the purpose of removing true blight.  As such, it creates an inefficient and 
impossibly conflicted regime in which RDAs seek out pseudo-blighted properties, 
when what they really want is to capture increment property values.  Tax 
increment financing (TIF) is one of the most widely used methods of generating 
the funds necessary to finance community redevelopment projects.86 TIF is 
permitted under the California Constitution,87 and is articulated by the California 
Supreme Court thusly:
84 See Kanner: Making Laws and Sausages, supra note 83, at 727 (discussing the 
importance of the role of railroads, which is why they were subsidized).
85
 A hand-off not only removes the project from oversight by the political process, it also 
removes the project from the stricter legal accountability that applies to government employers. 
86 JOYCE Y. MAN, Introduction, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 1; George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right for California 
Redevelopment Law, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 991, 996 (2001).
87 Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 16. That formula is as follows: 
(a) That portion of the taxes which would be produced by the rate upon which 
the tax is levied each year by . . . [the] taxing agencies upon the total sum of the 
assessed value of the taxable property in the redevelopment project as shown 
upon the assessment roll used in connection with the taxation of such property 
by such taxing agenc[ies], last equalized prior to the effective date of such 
ordinance [adopting the redevelopment plan], shall be allocated to . . . the funds 
of the respective taxing agencies . . .; and (P)(b) That portion of said levied taxes 
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In essence this section provides that if, after a 
redevelopment project has been approved, the assessed valuation 
of taxable property in the project increases, the taxes levied on 
such property in the project area are divided between the taxing
agency and the redevelopment agency. The taxing agency receives 
the same amount of money it would have realized under the 
assessed valuation existing at the time the project was approved, 
while the additional money resulting from the rise in assessed 
valuation is placed in a special fund for repayment of indebtedness 
incurred in financing the project.88
TIF experienced enormous popularity in California after the adoption of 
Proposition 13, which strictly limited increases in property taxes.89 California 
was the first state to adopt TIF,90 and its TIF laws are amazingly detailed and 
complex, totaling over three hundred printed pages.91
The allure of TIFs, of course, is that it provides a way that RDAs may, in 
theory, pay for their projects without putting additional burden on the general tax 
each year in excess of such amount shall be allocated to . . . a special fund of the 
redevelopment agency . . . .
Id. 
88
 Redevelopment Agency v. County of San Bernardino, 21 Cal. 3d 255, 259 (1978); see 
also County of Santa Clara v. Redevelopment Agency, 18 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1011 (1993): 
Increment revenue, which is the primary source of funding for 
redevelopment projects, consists of the increased property tax revenue resulting 
from rises in the assessed valuation of property in a redevelopment project area. 
Taxing agencies continue to receive the amount of revenue they would have 
received under the assessed valuation existing at the time the project was 
approved, while the additional revenue attributable to the project is placed in a 
special fund of the redevelopment agency for repayment of indebtedness 
incurred in financing the project.
Id. 
89
 Man, supra note 86, at 17.
90 Id. 
91 CRAIG L. JOHNSON & KENNETH A. KRIZ, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing 
Laws, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 32. 
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base.92 And naturally, the TIF system is not without its criticisms.93  But in the 
context of our discussion of structural defects in the California redevelopment 
regime, perhaps the most compelling criticism is that it improperly incentivizes 
RDAs to plan project areas where private enterprise is already likely to invest.94
92 But see JOYCE Y. MAN, Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic 
Development, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at
105 (“Given the conflicting views with respect to the effectiveness of TIF, more research needs to 
be done before we can reach a consensus, if any, on the issue of whether TIF programs have 
achieved their goals of stimulating economic development.”).  And yet despite the uncertain 
efficacy of TIF, California has wagered $61 billion in RDA debt, largely funded through TIF, in 
hopes that TIF will pay out.  See MORR Report, supra note 1, at 11. 
93
 These criticisms include: (1) TIFs provide an inefficient incentive system; (2) TIFs 
represent a zero-sum game that simply rearranges wealth, but does not actually generate new 
revenues; (3) TIF systems allow municipalities to capture the revenue from other municipalities, 
most notably from school districts; (4) TIF systems are complex and administratively costly; (5) 
TIF systems provide little or no voter participation, and as such are an improper delegation of 
legislative power; (6) TIF systems provide an incentive for RDAs to initiate projects irrespective 
of the likelihood that development would be initiated by private enterprise.  Man, supra note 86, at 
4-7. 
94
 Man explains further:
Although local governments claim to adopt the TIF program as an incentive to 
induce development in an area that would have otherwise not occurred, in some 
cases it could be argued that such development would have occurred without the 
incentive provided through TIF.  There are also charges that local incentives 
under TIF mislead some firms to an inappropriate location and that government 
subsidies are provided to firms or affluent areas that do not need them, thus 
wasting taxpayers’ money.  
Id. at 6.
TIF is a popular tool when redevelopment is truly necessary and TIF is 
used in an appropriate manner.  However, in some cases when TIF is misused, 
school and other affected jurisdictions often object to TIF on the grounds that 
they lose tax revenues from investments in the area unrelated to the TIF district 
and fear increased demand on their services without compensation.
JOYCE Y. MAN, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax Increment Financing, TAX 
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 91, n.3; see also CRAIG 
L. JOHNSON, Conclusion, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
51, at 258, discussing sales tax increment finance programs (STIFs) (“The most attractive areas for 
generating [] tax increment flows are not blighted urban areas, but rather undeveloped tracts or 
areas with the potential for manufacturing or wholesaling development that will add to the 
regional export base.”).  Johnson also urges for careful oversight of RDAs’ use of TIF:
TIF projects must be carefully planned, continually monitored, diligently 
implemented, critically evaluated, and ultimately terminated.  The laws of a state 
that govern the TIF process must be structured to channel the political process 
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The ideal site for the production of a big tax increment is 
either vacant when declared a redevelopment project area or easily 
cleared. It must also be a site upon which private redevelopers are 
ready to build immediately. This usually precludes redevelopment 
of the most crime-ridden and poverty-stricken sites in town 
because there is simply no alternate market for them.
. . . .
The realities of TIF contradict the premise . . . that 
redevelopment powers should be reserved exclusively for projects 
which private developers wouldn't have built on their own.95
Blight removal is, at bottom, only an indirect boon to revenue stimulation.  
CRL is carefully designed to ensure that future revenues are not a direct or 
principal motivator of RDAs in their duty of removing community blight.96  TIFs 
and financial subsidies in ways that further the public interest.  A finding of 
blight in a TID [tax increment district] creates the link between the activities of 
private developers and the public purpose necessary for government to exercise 
the powers of eminent domain and support a project using tax dollars.  In 
addition, if the development would have occurred without the expenditure of 
public TIF funds (i.e., the “but for” test was not passed), then a larger public 
purpose has not been served, and development should be left to the private 
sector. . . . [A] blighted finding and but for test . . . are fundamentally sound 
“first” principles and do provide the underpinning justification for TIF . . . .
Id. at 258-59.
95
 Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 1003-05 (emphasis added).  Lefcoe explains further:
This premise is beside the point to redevelopment officials single-mindedly 
following the money.  For this reason, a much favored strategy is to include 
within newly established redevelopment project area boundaries major private 
projects already scheduled for construction. Though patently illegal because 
these projects would have been built even in the absence of redevelopment, the 
ensuing tax increment jump-starts the rest of the redevelopment effort.
Id. at 1005.
96
 Jeff Chapman explains:
TIF redevelopment must be carefully monitored by public-sector 
decision makers.  There is a good deal of money involved in the process, and 
there are often conflicting pressures on the RDA.  These pressures come from 
the jurisdiction that initiated the redevelopment agency, developers, advocates 
for low-income residents, citizens, and overlapping jurisdictions.  Gradually, the 
California law has been tightened to ensure that redevelopment activity is in 
response to blight, not in response to fiscal stress or arcane state revenue 
distribution formulas. 
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create a counter-productive incentive system, as George Lefcoe points out, and it 
is no wonder that RDAs are falling over themselves to find “blight” in their 
neighborhoods so that they can sell more bonds against tax increments.  If a 
project is inefficiently planned in an area that would have been developed just as 
well in the private sector without the RDA, the effect is that the taxpayer winds up 
footing the costs of the development instead of the private developer.97  This will 
likely have a direct impact on the school district that is now frozen out of its share 
of the tax increment,98 enrich bond brokers and investors, inspire TIF-funded 
municipal bidding wars,99 and keep the RDA in business.100 Thus while TIF is 
. . . . If [blight statutes] are accurately followed, the use of TIF to avoid 
fiscal stress would be more difficult.  
Chapman, supra note 51, at 129.  Chapman explains additional legislative changes considered by 
the California legislature, including a requirement that RDAs show a link between expenditures 
and blight removal, and a prohibition on projects that benefited automobile dealerships and other 
big box retailers.  “In the year in which the law was completing the legislative process . . . 
redevelopment agencies placed about three times more land into project areas than they had in the 
year before.”  Id. at 129-30.  
97 Id. at 131. 
If development is occurring in a particular area, or if that area is 
situated in a location in which development is highly likely to occur in the future 
. . . then a property tax increment will be generated.  If a redevelopment agency 
decides to consider this area as blighted, it will unjustly appropriate the 
increment, the overlapping jurisdictions will not receive their fair share, and it is 
likely that the redevelopment project is being formed for reasons other than 
blight.Id. 
98
 “The efficiency justification for TIF is weakened when the project would have been 
built anyway somewhere within the boundaries of the school district or county.  Redevelopment 
proponents admit this possibility but contend that without their efforts poor areas would continue 
deteriorating while rich areas prosper.”  Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 997.
99
 “Taxpayers are understandably chagrined when municipalities try to lure private 
developers away from each other with tax dollars. The temptation is always present and often 
proves irresistible when most of the funding comes from taxing entities other than the one 
extending the subsidy.”  Id. at 1007.
100
 “To succeed in California, a redevelopment agency depends on there being new 
construction or a change in ownership within project area boundaries since California's property 
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attractive in theory, its abuse is just too great a temptation for California’s 
misconceived and misdirected RDAs. 
Jeff Chapman encapsulates the incentive problem in California 
redevelopment law with respect to TIF:
Over the past fifteen years, California has enacted a complex series 
of laws that have attempted to ensure that TIF development is used 
appropriately.  This illustrates that continual monitoring is 
necessary in order to convince the agencies, developers, and public 
that TIF is being used to eliminate blight—the purpose for which it 
was justified.  But even under these continuing legal constraints, 
redevelopment agencies are likely to continue to search for excep-
tions . . . .
TIF can be a useful tool.  Projects can generate revenue 
streams that can be turned into a self-financing instrument.  But it 
only works correctly if it is carefully planned, monitored, and 
implemented under the light of public scrutiny.101
IV. POWER AND PRAGMATISM
A. The People Will Not Receive Current Redevelopment Law
When Solon, the great Athenian lawmaker, was asked whether he had 
given to the Athenians the best laws he could devise, he replied that he had given 
them instead “the best they w[ou]ld receive.’”102 Solon recognized that laws must 
not only be just, but they must be agreeable to those they mean to govern.  The 
tax regime allows for assessments to current market value only upon a change in ownership or 
new construction.”  Id. at 1003. 
101 See Chapman, supra note 51, at 132.
102
 James Madison, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 317 (Ohio Univ. 
Press, 1966) (July 18, 1787).  Solon wrote the Solonian Constitution, incorporating the first 
elements of a civil democracy.  His laws were a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, 
appeasing both the aristocrats and the ordinary people. 
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Kelo decision dismayed the entire nation, transcending party and class 
designations, and regardless of the lawfulness of the decision, the people have not 
received it.  People are angry at the decision, and unwilling to accept that their 
local government officials have the right to take their homes to boost tax 
revenues.  “The Court's stature plummeted when it endorsed taking private 
property for private use.”103 In the wake of Kelo, Professor Thomas Merrill was 
surprised by the public outcry.  “Merrill finally decided that ‘the nub of the 
problem is that the American people believe that property rights are invested with 
moral significance.’”104
The policy towards defending individual rights is not a groundless one, 
nor is it merely normative.  It is rooted in notions of pragmatism, the notion that 
the right action is not always the one that looks best on paper.  It is the notion that 
embraces the plain fact that humans are not rational economic actors, and that 
even if we were, we cannot possibly understand or accurately assess all of the 
values at stake in social choices.  Pragmatism is the practical companion to 
utilitarianism.  Although utilitarianism seeks the greatest good, it is often 
conflated with applied economics, and sets to the task of gathering and calculating 
values to determine the best outcome.  While such an approach is a useful 
103 Douglas W. Kmiec, Abandoning Common Sense, CAL. LAW., Sep. 2005, at 21, 21.
Polls have described the backlash: 89% of people are opposed to takings for economic 
development.  Michael Corkery & Ryan Chittum, Eminent Domain Uproar Imperils Projects, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at B1.  Another poll increased the number to 93%.  Matt Welch, The 
Left's Eyeing Your Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at M6.
104
 Sandefur, supra note 7, at 706.
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academic exercise, and would ostensibly endorse such redevelopment decisions as 
those in Poletown and Kelo, it fails to take into account certain unshakable 
principles to which human beings cling, namely that we should be free in our 
property.105  To claim that such tenacity is irrational is of no use.  Irrational it is, 
and so we must account for it.  To do otherwise would be to act irrationally 
ourselves.  And as aristocratic policy makers, we cannot afford such a folly.  
Thankfully, we can deal with irrationality.  It is unpredictability that would prove 
troublesome.  If people’s reactions towards violations of these principles were 
unpredictable, we may not be able to account for them in any meaningful way.  
But they are not.  People may be irrational, but taken en masse they are quite
predictable.  
So what is this “irrational” sentiment to which we humans, particularly we 
Americans, cling?  The overwhelming feeling is that “[n]o Americans, no matter 
how poor and powerless, should be forcibly thrown out of their own homes and 
undercompensated in the process; certainly not because another private party 
wants to make money from their land without observing the basic societal nicety 
of buying it in a voluntary transaction.”106 “There are a lot of citizens who are 
offended by the widespread employment of this power—and not all of them are 
105
 People v. Lacey, 787 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2004) (unpublished disposition), 
available at 2004 WL 1040676.  Although this language refers to privacy, it accurately captures 
the attitude that average landowners have towards their property. 
106
 Kanner, supra note 53, at 381 (emphasis added).  
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completely rational about it.”107  “Regardless of the amount paid, many people are 
offended that they can be forced by their government to yield their property so 
that somebody else can profit from it.”108
For many, the jig is up, and citizens are becoming aware that “government 
agencies [are] try[ing] to balance their budgets on the backs of faultless property 
owners who are simply unlucky enough to own the wrong land at the wrong 
time.”109 An upset Poletown resident objected to Detroit’s plan thusly: “Even in 
communist Poland we can find no record of churches being torn down along with,
or without, their neighborhood homes to establish an industrial facility.” 110
George Lefcoe remarks that “[t]axpayers are understandably chagrined when 
municipalities try to lure private developers away from each other with tax 
dollars.”111
B. Fixing the Problem
So what is needed?  Propertarians are angry, to be sure, but do they offer 
anything helpful in the stead of the current regime?  Although the idea of eminent 
domain sours the stomach, it is arguably quite necessary in the concept of an 
107
 Michael M. Berger, Update on the Right to Take 13 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jan. 
2005) available at SK045 ALI-ABA 1.  Berger goes on to describe a South Carolina man who 
shot and killed two sheriff’s deputies as the State Department of Transportation came to take his 
land to widen a highway.  Afterwards, the man remarked “‘If we can’t be any freer than that in 
this country, I’d rather die.’”  This type of event, though not likely to become very common, 
should at least serve as a “warning to government agencies that there may be something amiss in 
their acquisition procedures.”  Id. 
108 Id. at 15.
109 Id. at 14.
110 POLETOWN LIVES! (Information Factory 1983).
111
 Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 1007.
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ordered liberty protected by a sovereign government.  “Government agencies at 
all levels have become blasé about their use of the power of eminent domain . . . 
.”
112
“Should the process of public land acquisition grind to a halt? Nothing so 
drastic is needed. Perhaps, however, governments at all levels could use a bit of 
what the touchy-feely folks call sensitivity training.”113  However, the solution 
will be ne ither easily implemented nor easily known.  “Eminent domain abuse is a 
symptom of a profound cultural and philosophical breakdown, meaning that really 
fixing the problem posed by Kelo will take much more than political action.”114
On the other side of the debate, municipalities are perhaps just as attached 
to their redevelopment powers as individuals are to the homes and businesses.  
During the debate over Poletown, Detroit city council member Clyde Cleveland 
complained that he was “sick and tired of one of the best things that has happened 
to the city of Detroit, that people have used every obstruction and tactic they 
could come up with in order to block it.”115  Similarly, Erma Henderson, another
Detroit city council member, said “I don’t know why they persist in doing 
this.”116 The paradigm of local governments in providing services and competing 
with neighboring cities and towns in the past 50 years has become more and more 
112
 Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 12.
112
 82 Cal. App. 4th 511 (2000); see also STEVEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW 
GOVERNMENT MISUSES EMINENT DOMAIN 144 (2005) (“This is how governments now routinely 
operate, taking property from small owners and giving them to big ones, and treating the 
victimized owners shabbily.  It's no aberration.”).
113
 Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 14.
114
 Sandefur, supra note 7, at 707. 
115 POLETOWN LIVES!, supra note 110.
116 Id. 
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entangled with and dependent upon the notion of coercive bargaining and 
redevelopment.  Weaning them off of this dependency will not be easy.  It is not 
enough that an RDA make a “lawful”117 exercise of authority, nor is it enough 
that the benefits of the project outweigh the immediate political costs.  Just as the 
private market often fails to accurately assess the externalities of its actions, 
especially as to long-range externalities, politicians and RDAs fail to appreciate 
the sociological externalities of their coercive methods in redevelopment. 
The city of Detroit provides a good example of this in its exercise of 
redevelopment and eminent domain authority to obliterate the community of 
Poletown, replete with beautiful churches and vibrant businesses.  As part of its 
strategy to demoralize and dismantle the steadfastness of the community’s 
holdouts, the city approached Cardinal John F. Dearden of the Archdiocese of 
Detroit to acquire the community’s Catholic churches, the Immaculate 
117
 It is of little comfort that redevelopment agencies be procedurally precise.  Given the 
difficulty and expense in surmounting blight findings, not to mention finding and availing oneself 
of the narrow windows available for such objections, it is the rare challenger that is able to mount 
a successful attack against a careful RDA staff that has been adequately prepared by city attorneys. 
This is not to mention that one must learn to watch out for the wiles and pretext of the agency:
Officials are often required to draft a redevelopment plan before 
proceeding; such a plan will include fact-finding by consultants, who are hired 
to advise the city on whether a specified area is “blighted.” These consultants 
are too often willing to tell cities whatever they want to hear; in one recent 
California case, a trial court rejected the findings of a consultant that had 
performed what it euphemistically called a “windshield survey” of a 
neighborhood to determine whether it was blighted.  A windshield survey, of 
course, means that the consultant simply drove through the neighborhood before 
writing up a report declaring the neighborhood blighted.
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 716-17.
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Conception and St. John the Evangelist.118  The backlash against the Archdiocese 
was great.  Reverend Joseph Karasiewicz of the Immaculate Conception Church, 
was an important leader in the protest against both the Archdiocese’s decision and 
the city’s scheme to demolish his parishioners’ homes, businesses, and churches.  
Karasiewicz’s defiance of his Cardinal and Archdiocese is indicative of the 
sociological impacts that coercive governmental dealings create.  He denounced 
the city’s actions, saying “this is an evil law, and we have to fight it.”119 For his 
protesting Karasiewicz was kicked out of the rectory and never given another 
permanent assignment.  Parishioner Ann Locklear remarked a year after her 
evacuation that she had “lost my faith in the Church, the city and General 
Motors.”120  “It's the principle of the thing,” said Poletown resident Kris 
Biernacki.121  “I think the whole thing stinks. I just don't believe it happened.  It's 
breathtaking. We didn't have a voice in it—not a voice. We didn't want to move. 
We were literally forced to move out. We were just told to go.”122
Eventually, of course, the last of the residents were eliminated, some 
forcibly,123 and the neighborhood homes and churches were obliterated to make 
118 POLETOWN LIVES!, supra note 110; see also Jenny Nolan, Auto Plant vs. 
Neighborhood: The Poletown Battle, THE DETROIT NEWS,  
http://info.detnews.com/history/story/index.cfm?id=18&category=business. 
119
 Jacob Sullum, Rediscovering Property Rights in the Rubble of Poletown, THE 
ECOLOGIC POWERHOUSE (Oct. 2004), http://www.eco.freedom.org/articles/sullum-1004.shtml
(last visited Apr. 29, 2006).
120
 Nolan, supra note 118.
121
 Sullum, supra note 119. 
122 Id. 
123 See POLETOWN LIVES!, supra note 110 (depicting the arrest of several elderly women 
during the final protest of the taking and demolition of their neighborhood church).  
Who Will Redevelop Redevelopment? 35
way for the sprawling green GM campus.  Over time, the story of the Poletown 
residents’ fight disappeared from the headlines.  But the fight remains an integral 
part of American legal history.  The case appears in every property law textbook 
as the archetypical illustration of the devastating power of redevelopment and the 
consequences of a deferential blight standard. 
C. Where’s the Blight?  California Redevelopment Abuse
Preeminent redevelopment attorney Murray O. Kane exposed Diamond 
Bar’s bogus blight determination in Diamond Bar.  “The mere fact of multiple 
ownership does not establish blight. Otherwise, a condominium development by 
definition would be blighted.”124  Kane provided a videotaped 28 minute tour of 
Dia mond Bar’s designated project area to illustrate in the plainest of terms the 
senselessness of the City’s blight claims. As to this video, the appellate court 
remarked: “[We] feel[] compelled to comment that [we] viewed the plaintiffs' 
videotapes in their entirety and did not perceive anything remotely resembling 
blight. The videotapes depicted modern, well-maintained, retail and office 
structures, amidst ample landscaping and open space, in a partially rustic set-
ting.”125The Kelo decision has kindled national recognition of eminent domain 
abuse through redevelopment.  Kelo sends the message to homeowners and 
business owners that no property is safe that attracts the attention of the local 
RDA.  However, Californians are not up against the same unfettered 
124
 Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 80 Cal. App. 4th 388, 407 (2000).
125 Id. at 394 n.4.
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governmental power that Kelo validated.  At least, not in theory.  California’s 
blight standard was designed to provide additional checks against the kind of 
seemingly arbitrary abuse that Kelo showed was otherwise permissible.  But does 
California’s CRL actually provide any meaningful check against the full brunt of 
the federal Kelo rule for takings?  Or does the California blight standard simply 
mean more paperwork for the RDAs?  California Health and Safety Code treats 
redevelopment as a “last resort.”126  But do redevelopment agencies? 
D. Treatment of Blight in California Case Law
Commentators have noted the relative severity of California blight laws.  
“Nowhere have the statutory definitions of blight, and judicial enforcement of 
those standards, been more restrictive than in California.”127  “In California, based 
solely on the administrative record, courts will overturn a local government's 
finding of blight, or a trial court's affirmation of such a finding, for want of 
substantial evidence supporting the decision.”128  Compared to the treatment of 
blight by other state courts,129 California shows markedly less deference to RDAs.
126
 Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 997; Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33030(b)(1) (West 2006) 
(providing for redevelopment only when the extent of blight “constitutes a serious physical and 
economic burden . . . which cannot reasonably be expected to be reversed or alleviated by private 
enterprise or governmental action, or both, without redevelopment”).
127
 Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 991. 
128 Id. at 1010 (citing Fosselman's, Inc. v. City of Alhambra, 224 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363-64 
(Ct. App. 1986)). 
129 See id. (describing other state court tests, including overturning when the 
determination was arbitrary and capricious and without any evidentiary support (Miller v. City of 
Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464, 474–75 (Wash. 1963)), only for findings arising from “fraud, bad faith, 
[or] abuse of discretion” (Urban Renewal Agency v. Decker, 415 P.2d 373, 377 (Kan. 1966)), or 
almost complete preclusion of challenges to RDA resolutions (Allen v. City Council, 113 S.E.2d 
621, 623-24 (Ga. 1960))).
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“City renewal directors quickly learned there was no realistic chance that private 
builders could be drawn to developing commercial projects in hopelessly blighted 
areas.”130 On the other hand, “[w]ith more than 200 condemnations benefiting 
private parties in the five years between 1998 and 2003, California is one of the 
leading abusers of eminent domain in America.”131 “Proposals in other states, 
including two brought forward in the California Legislature, even appear to have 
been consciously designed, in the words of one commentator, as ‘disingenuous" 
attempts’ to pretend to do something about eminent domain without actually 
doing anything to upset the apple cart.”132
Of course, if RDAs were really concerned with eliminating true blight,
they should be lauded.  But they are not so concerned, and nor could we possibly 
expect them to be.  CRL provides sticks, but few carrots to encourage RDAs to 
actually do good by removing actual blight.  TIF likewise provides maximum 
payouts for eliminating the “blight that’s right,”133 and that rarely means true 
blight.  Instead we find that RDAs apparently have no real desire for eliminating 
blight, but with drumming up whatever land they can assemble to attract big-box 
130 Id. at 994.
131
 Sandefur, supra note 7, at 736.
132 Id. at 706.  
133 See MORR Report, supra note 1, at 16 (“Corporate decisions once based on market 
forces are now determined by which city’s redevelopment agency will cut the best deal.”).  The 
amount of corporate welfare given by California RDAs is astonishing: Wal-Mart has taken an 
estimated $100 million, and Costco has taken $30 million from Orange County alone.  Id. at 15.
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retailers.134  Surely RDAs would prefer to do this with the most economically 
depressed areas; doing so would both eliminate blight and present lower up-front 
assembly costs.  But if these goals are only secondarily important to the primary 
goal of generating more tax revenue, then RDAs will “search[] for ‘the blight 
that’s right’—places just bad enough to clear but good enough to attract 
developers.”135 In other words, “[w]hen program administrators [cannot]
legitimately find blight in areas with good prospects for redevelopment, they 
fabricate[] it.”136
1. No “Naked Transfers” to Private Businesses: 99 Cents Only Stores v. 
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency137
99 Cents illustrates precisely the problem with not maintaining adequate 
separation between market and government and letting government agencies 
function as if they were market participants.  Market actors will unscrupulously 
outsmart RDAs and strong-arm them into using the power of eminent domain for 
their own advantage.  RDAs thus become, perhaps unwittingly, permanent 
participants in market actors' machinations and power plays against one 
another.138
134
 “Generally, governments undertake such projects on the theory that the more 
profitable new use will create jobs, spur economic growth in the city, and ultimately raise the local 
gov ernment's tax revenue.”  Sandefur, supra note 7, at 715-16.
135
 Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 994–5. 
136 Id. at 995.
137
 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
138 See MORR Report, supra note 1, at 16 (describing how Cerritos engaged in “auto 
dealer piracy,” and siphoned nearly all of neighboring Lakewood’s auto dealerships, earning itself 
the nickname, the “‘Darth Vader of Cities.’”).  
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In 1988, the Lancaster Redevelopment Agency used its powers of 
redevelopment to “revitalize” the area in the “Amargosa Plan,” the cornerstone of 
which was to be the “Power Center,” home to Costco, Wal-Mart, Circuit City, and 
HomeBase.139  Costco moved into the Power Center in that same year and 
proceeded to be very profitable for the next ten years.  Then, in 1998, 99 Cents 
moved into the vacant space next door to Costco and proceeded to do very 
profitable business of its own, with sales in excess of $5 million in its first full 
year.140  Lancaster openly expressed its affection for 99 Cents because of the 
terrific sales tax revenues it generated for the city.141
Then, the great sleeping giant stirred: Costco decided to expand.  
Although expansion was possible to the south of its existing facility, Costo did 
neither consider this option nor approach 99 Cents to negotiate a buy-out of its 
lease.  Instead, having previously known the benefits of RDA-assisted expansion, 
Costco went directly to the city of Lancaster and threatened to relocate to 
neighboring Palmdale and to “leave the Lancaster store shuttered and unoccupied, 
refusing to rent it to anyone else,”142 if it could not obtain 99 Cents’ property.143
Terrified at the prospect of losing “the city’s 800-pound gorilla,”144 the City 
139
 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 
1125 (C.D. 2001). 
140 Id. at 1126.
141 Id. 
142
 Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 6.
143 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
144
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approved a development agreement to use its best efforts to acquire the property 
and sell it to Costco for $1.00.145
The court ruled against the City.  The City failed to renew its blight 
findings, even though it had opportunity to do so at two separate occasions.146
The court noted that the City’s scheme “rest[ed] on nothing more than the desire 
to achieve the naked transfer of property from one private party to another,”147
and that “the very reason that Lancaster decided to condemn 99 Cents’ leasehold 
interest was to appease Costco.”148  The City’s failure to abide by the statutory 
blight requirements barred it from exercising its eminent domain authority and 
left its improper motives exposed to judicial reprimand.   
Although the facts of this case were just plain rotten for Lancaster, could 
our federal constitution, as interpreted under Kelo, have come to the same 
conclusion and striking down the use of eminent domain?  Probably not without a 
sympathetic and “activist” court.149  The added evidentiary check of California’s 
blight requirements ultimately exposed the greed and manipulation behind the 
attempted land grab. 
145 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.  The author notes that $0.99 would have been more 
poetic. 
146 Id. at 1125-26.  In neither the 1994 plan amendment to extend TIF benefits nor the 
1997 plan amendment to renew condemnation rights did the RDA bother to make new evidentiary 
findings of blight.  Id. 
147 Id. at 1129.
148 Id. 
149 But see Kanner, supra note 53, at 383 (“The Constitution does not require courts to 
facilitate predatory behavior by business-government alliances seeking to increase their cash flow 
by depriving people of modest means of their homes. The Public Use clause is not ‘hortatory 
fluff.’”).
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It is easy to be callous towards the City of Lancaster in its failed attempt to 
establish blight.  Noted one commentator, “Eight hundred-pound gorillas can be 
tough to deal with, but sometimes it is best to just tell them to pipe down and eat 
their bananas.”150 It is fun to quip at the situation, but we must not take this over-
simplified conclusion seriously.  The city perhaps could not have done any 
differently: it was forced to negotiate with the hostage-taker (Costco), and thus 
had to demonstrate that it was doing everything in its power to fulfill the 
demands.  Although the court ultimately barred the transfer, if the City had not 
been able to work out a separate agreement with Costco, Costco would have
moved to a neighboring city as it had threatened to do, and “killed” Lancaster’s 
hostage (its sales tax revenues).  This would have been a grave casualty.  Thus the 
judicial remedy is an unsatisfying solution.  While it protects challengers in these 
more egregious cases, it leaves cities unprotected from unscrupulous mega-tax-
generators like Costco who threaten to use the town’s own redevelopment tools 
against it.151
150
 Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 8.
151 It starts to become clear that the City may have been an unwitting victim.  Given the 
tools to bring in an “800 pound gorilla” such as Costco, a city will naturally use them.  If it does 
not, the next town certainly will.  Costco, realizing of course that Lancaster possesses the 
awesome power of eminent domain, need only exert the correct amount of pressure to obtain that 
power.  “Future blight” is thus a very real danger for the city; it has invested millions in bringing 
in its 800 pound gorillas, and if they leave it will very likely leave the area a shambles.  This is 
basic hostage negotiations strategy: a hostage-taker will only demand what he believes the 
negotiator can provide.  If the negotiator can make the hostage-taker believe that the negotiator 
simply cannot provide what he wants, then the hostage-taker will not demand it.  Thus 99 Cents
instructs that, to prevent Costcos from taking their respective cities' sales tax revenues hostage, it 
need only be made clear that the power of redevelopment for such a purpose is off the table.
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2. More than Lip Service to Blight Requirements: Friends of Mammoth v. 
Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency152
This case involved a community challenge to the RDA of the mountain 
town of Mammoth after it sought to establish a redevelopment project area.153
The Town’s plan specifically authorized the RDA “to provide or participate in 
providing at least 72 separate and identified public improvements and facilities” 
and “400 new housing units.”154  Plaintiffs contended that the RDA had failed to 
comply with CRL with respect to its blight findings, and with the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in the Town’s Environmental Impact Report 
(EIR).
The appellate court agreed with Plaintiffs, holding that the RDA had failed 
to produce sufficient evidence to support its finding that the project area suffered
from physical conditions causing blight, and failed to show sufficient evidence 
that the buildings were economically nonviable or that adjacent incompatible uses 
prevented economic development.155  The court examined the Town’s evidence 
regarding unsafe or unhealthy buildings.156  Although the Town provided building 
surveys for the project area, the surveys failed to define what a violation entailed, 
and how the violation could constitute blight under section 33031(a)(1).157  “The 
152
 82 Cal. App. 4th 511 (2000).
153
 One critic called this “a scam to designate much of the resort town of Mammoth Lakes 
as ‘blighted,’ so it could be ‘redeveloped’ . . . into a more profitable recreational community.”  
Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 4. 
154 Friends of Mammoth, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 524. 
155 Id. at 559-60.
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 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33031(a)(1) (West 2006).
157 Friends of Mammoth, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 550.
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Town Council thus could not know whether the evidence of building code 
violations demonstrated the existence of buildings that were unsafe or unhealthy 
for human occupation, nor can we.”158  The court also reviewed the findings of 
“deterioration and dilapidation.”159  The Town had pointed to houses that had 
been “constructed with single glazed windows and electric heating” and rendered 
them therefore to be unsafe.160  The Town pointed to “inadequate depths for retail
display” and energy inefficiency as evidence of “defective design and substandard 
construction.”161  These claims did not pass the laugh test, and the court held that 
this could not be found to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of the Code.162
Ultimately, the Town could not fool the court into believing that blight 
removal was really its goal.  Blight is not merely an evidentiary hurdle; it 
represents the finish line itself.  It is the very point of redevelopment in the first 
place.  Before an RDA can get to its actual purposes of redevelopment, it must do 
more than just play lip service to the state’s requirements.  Because California’s 
blight requirements are relatively strict, “the courts are required to be more than 
rubber stamps for local governments.”163
158 Id. at 550-51.
159 Id. at 551. 
160 Id. at 552.
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 556.
163 Id. at 538.
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3. More than Merely Higher and Better Use: Beach-Courchesne v. City of 
Diamond Bar164
In 1995, Diamond Bar, an affluent suburban community of pricey low-
density housing and low crime,165 wished to increase commercial development.  
To accomplish this, the City relied on its redevelopment powers and established a 
1,300 area redevelopment project area.166  In its attempt to comply with CRL, the 
City made findings that the area suffered from blight that was “‘so prevalent and 
so substantial that it causes a reduction of, and a lack of, proper utilization of the 
area to such an extent that it constitutes a serious physical and economic burden 
on the community which cannot be expected to be reversed or alleviated by 
private enterprise or governmental action, or both, without redevelopment.’”167
Here again the court found that the City did not satisfy its evidentiary 
burden in showing blight.  The City pointed to “multiple ownership”168 as 
evidence of physical blight, but the court rejected this claim, reasoning that “[t]he 
mere fact of multiple ownership does not establish blight. Otherwise, a 
condominium development by definition would be blighted.”169  The court found 
the rest of the City’s evidence of blight wanting and invalidated the 
redevelopment plan.170The City’s implicit reasoning is that the definition of blight should be 
made to include not only the removal of uses that produce externalities, but uses 
164
 80 Cal. App. 4th 388 (2000).
165 Id. at 392. 
166 Id. at 393. 
167 Id. at 393 (emphasis added). 
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169 Diamond Bar, 80 Cal. App. 4th at 405.
170 Id. at 407. 
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that fall short of the highest and best theoretical use.  The court rejected the
interpretation that a public use could be merely a more beneficial use, stating that 
“the concededly desirable goal of improving an area is ‘insufficient by itself to 
justify use of the extraordinary powers of community redevelopment.’”171
Following the instruction of the California Supreme Court, the court stated that it 
would be “‘chary of the use of the [redevelopment] act unless . . . there is a 
situation where the blight is such that it constitutes a real hindrance to the 
development of the city . . . . It never can be used just because the public agency 
considers that it can make a better use or planning of an area than its present use 
or plan.’”172  And further, “[t]he CRL is not simply a vehicle for cash-strapped 
municipalities to finance community improvements. If the showing made in the 
case were sufficient to rise to the level of blight, it is the rare locality in California 
that is not afflicted with that condition.”173
The decision in Diamond Bar assuages the fear that Justice O’Connor 
articulated in her dissenting opinion in Kelo: 
For who among us can say she already makes the most productive 
or attractive possible use of her property? The specter of 
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the 
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home 
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.174
171 Id. at 395 (quoting Regus v. City of Baldwin Park 70 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (1977)).
172 Id. at 395 (quoting Sweetwater Valley Civic Assn. v. City of National City 18 Cal. 3d 
270, 278 (1976)) (emphasis added).
173 Id. at 407.
174
 Kelo v. Town of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2676 (2005) (O’Connor, dissenting).
But see Sandefur, supra note 7, at 717 (“Such amorphous standards [in California redevelopment 
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The pragmatism of redevelopment is of great concern to California 
attorneys such as Murray O. Kane.  Although Kane’s clients are typically 
RDAs,175 he took on Diamond Bar’s RDA when it used “blight” as “simply a 
vehicle . . . to finance community improvements.”176  Kane explained his 
motivation for fighting the city of Diamond Bar:  “If Diamond Bar gets away with 
it, then California's reform legislation is greatly weakened, and a legislative 
backlash could go beyond stopping redevelopment abuse, and will also hurt 
redevelopment in truly blighted areas where redevelopment is really needed.”177
Kane is worried about a tragedy of the commons in a redevelopment context.  If 
the redevelopment powers are “over-harvested” such as to instigate serious 
political revolt against them, they will become barren and useless, and will no 
longer be available for the purposes for which they were intended and for which 
they are still needed. Kane’s remarks remind us that it is important for redevelopment 
proponents to not only protect the formal redevelopment powers, but the 
pragmatic foundations of its exercise.  Cases like Poletown and Kelo have already 
opened Pandora’s box, piquing citizens’ interest as to what redevelopment is all 
about and whether they might fall prey to it.  Without careful review in California 
in such cases as 99 Cent Stores, Diamond Bar, and Mammoth Lakes, these 
law] make it possible to declare property blighted whenever officials believe it is failing to 
produce revenue at a level that they would like to see.”).
175 See Murray O. Kane—Biography, http://www.kbblaw.com/members_kane.htm (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2006).
176
 Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 80 Cal. App. 4th 388, 407 (2000).
177 Did Diamond Bar Conduct a $450 Million Raid on School Funds?, DIAMOND 
BAR/WALNUT NEWS GAZETTE, May 1, 1999 (emphasis added).
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respective cities’ RDAs threaten to kill the golden goose of redevelopment.  The 
public has its eye trained on redevelopment agencies; will it abide the kinds of 
choices RDAs have made in recent years?  
V. AN ARGUMENT FOR REFORM
The idea, of course, is that RDAs are in power for the purpose of 
eliminating blight so that redevelopment can happen.  The misfortune of the 
whole enterprise was perhaps in the nomenclature—a “redevelopment agency” 
wants to do more than just eliminate blight: it wants to redevelop.  Of course the 
two things are inextricably linked.  But the phenomena that began to occur was 
that the primary focus left the sphere of blight removal and instead became the 
redevelopment itself.  This leads to RDAs searching not for the worst instances of 
blight, but instead the “blight that’s right”178 and other opportunities to bring more 
tax revenue—tax revenue which was supposed to be a nice fringe benefit of 
redevelopment, but which has actually become the primary motivator.  As a 
result, we are in need of reform that reminds RDAs why they exist in the first 
place.  One way to do this might be to require greater evidentiary support of the 
blight in each case.  “[I]t was suggested to the legislative committees that they 
more closely tie condemnation to conditions of blight by requiring redevelopment 
agencies in resolutions of necessity to make parcel-specific findings of blight and 
thereby link the proposed project to the blighting conditions identified by the 
178
 Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 994-95.
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agencies.”179 However, while this may help stem the tide of bad redevelopment, 
we must correct the faulty incentive structure.  The California legislature has 
recognized some of the dangerous incentives that encourage bad redevelopment: 
The state legislature recognized the irresistible attraction for 
redevelopment agencies to lure big, tax-generating uses to vacant 
sites, blighted or not. To remove this temptation, the legislature 
banned automobile dealerships in redevelopment project areas 
from being located on land never previously developed for urban 
uses. Cal. Health & Safety Code 33426.5(a) (West 1999). The 
legislature also banned development that would generate sales 
taxes from being located on a parcel of land five acres or larger, 
unless the principal permitted use was office, hotel, manufacturing, 
or industrial. Cal. Health & Safety Code 33426.5(b) (West 
1999).180
If it is really the case that RDAs simply cannot help themselves when it comes to 
things like auto dealerships and Costcos, then instead of making provisions for 
certain types of the particularly juicy earners, perhaps it is more sensible to 
remove this insidious incentive altogether, instead of a piecemeal approach.  
These types of exclusions illustrate the lack of principle in the approach to 
redevelopment.181 Through such legislation, RDAs are still improperly motivated 
179
 Tepper, supra note 11, at 42.
The way to address Kelo-type issues is to require a site-specific blight finding at 
the time of the hearing on a resolution of necessity.  
Those seeking redevelopment reform should base their proposals on 
reported California decisions invalidating redevelopment plans and not upon 
perceived abuses reported anecdotally by the press. Legitimate concerns exist 
regarding the use of the blight statutes by agencies in recent reported decisions. 
Nevertheless, real redevelopment reform will only occur if the legislature brings 
a precise focus to its efforts.
Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
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fraud, bad faith, and abuse of discretion (People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 307 (1959)), the 
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to eliminate real blight, but in the event that a project does eliminate real blight, it 
is forbidden from installing a big earner like an auto mall.  Thus they are told to 
seek out higher and better uses, but not the highest and best use.  
We might not even need eminent domain reform as much as we need 
reform to the incentive structure and general mindset behind redevelopment.  
Government cannot be expected to behave like a business because government is 
subject to a different set of legal rules, rules that are not designed for fair play in a 
market environment.  Thus a government redevelopment agency cannot be 
designed to have revenue-generation as its prime directive.  Government’s role in 
a republic is generally corrective, not speculative. Government’s job is to 
manicure an environment that is conducive to successful private enterprise; it is
private individuals and businesses that must make a community succeed.  That’s 
not just good policy; it is in principle what a republic is.182  Government only 
helps the market indirectly by providing services; market success cannot be 
government's direct goal; this just leads to too great a temptation to abuse its 
awesome powers.  A snow plow makes roads navigable that were otherwise 
California legislature finally annulled the Chevalier holding.  See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1245.255 
(1982) (stating that resolution not conclusive when procured by “gross abuse of discretion”).  
182 See Republic, 23 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 177 (1911).
[R]epublic has, however, always been understood to mean a state in which the 
head holds his place by the choice of his subjects. . . . What, however, is 
emphatically not a republic is a state in which the ruler can truly tell his subjects 
that the sovereignty resides in his royal person . . . . 
. . . [T]he community . . . [must] confine the head of the government to 
defined functions.
Id. 
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unnavigable.  But to tool around in the snow plow in normal conditions puts much 
unnecessary wear on the road, which will eventually become cracked and pitted, 
unsafe and unsuitable for those whom the plow was intended to serve.  
Cities can spot uses that are aggregate losers (blighted), and restore them 
to point zero.  The public use is satisfied in this.183  The subsequent hand off to 
private development should be largely ancillary.  Cities may not, however, 
identify properties that are not aggregate losers (not blighted), and call them 
losers (blighted) by pointing to a better market function.  This creates 
inappropriate government entanglement with free enterprise, a sphere in which 
the players must not be permitted to capture and use the government's tools 
against one another.184  It also overstates the role of government; when reasonable 
and profitable use is being made of land, it is not for government to improve upon 
it.185 Because an ill-conceived redevelopment regime allows rent-seekers to 
blackmail cities, and entices cities to use coercive bargaining and offend 
landowners’ sensibilities, RDAs are in danger of ruining the tools it needs to 
achieve their true purpose of blight removal.  We are on a road to revolt, and 
while the revolt might restore a principled approach to eminent domain abuse—
183 See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining how Michigan case law treats true blight removal as 
a public use). 
184 See supra Part IV.D.1 (explaining how Costco captured the power of eminent domain 
by holding Lancaster’s sales taxes hostage). 
185 See Berger, supra note 75, at 237 (arguing that monopoly and efficiency are not 
sufficient to justify a taking without an impending public need); Sandefur: A Gleeful Obituary, 
supra note 75, at 678 (“Americans in most states are at risk of losing their homes to whatever fac-
tion is able to gain political influence.”).
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and ostensibly provided needed protection to land owners—it will likely hurt 
cities’ ability to provide for their own welfare.  Thus we must remove the blight in
our redevelopment law, and redevelop the principles and policies underlying 
redevelopment agencies, in order to save them from a demise of their own doing. 
